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Economic development is a process of continuous 
industrial and technological upgrading in which any 
country, regardless of its level of development, can 
succeed if it develops industries that are consistent with 
its comparative advantage, determined by its endowment 
structure. The secret winning formula for developing 
countries is to exploit the latecomer advantage by 
building up industries that are growing dynamically 
in more advanced fast growing countries that have 
endowment structures similar to theirs. By following 
carefully selected lead countries, latecomers can emulate 
the leader-follower, flying-geese pattern that has served 
well successfully catching-up economies since the 18th 
century. 
   The emergence of large middle-income countries such 
as China, India, and Brazil as new growth poles in the 
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world, and their dynamic growth and climbing of the 
industrial ladder, offer an unprecedented opportunity to 
all developing economies with income levels currently 
below theirs—including those in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Having itself been a “follower goose,” China is on the 
verge of graduating from low-skilled manufacturing jobs 
and becoming a “leading dragon.” That will free up nearly 
100 million labor-intensive manufacturing jobs, enough 
to more than quadruple manufacturing employment in 
low-income countries. A similar trend is emerging in 
other middle-income growth poles. The lower-income 
countries that can formulate and implement a viable 
strategy to capture this new industrialization opportunity 
will set forth on a dynamic path of structural change that 
can lead to poverty reduction and prosperity. 
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When the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was established in 
1984  as  the  first  research  and  training  center  of  the  United  Nations  University,  under  the 
visionary leadership of then Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, its mandate was clearly 
set  out:  ―To  undertake  multidisciplinary  research  and  policy  analysis  on  structural  changes 
affecting the living conditions of the world‘s poorest people; to provide a forum for professional 
interaction  and  the  advocacy  of  policies  leading  to  robust,  equitable  and  environmentally 
sustainable  growth;  and  to  promote  capacity  strengthening  and  training  for  scholars  and 
government officials in the field of economic and social policy making.‖ Since then WIDER has 
contributed enormously to the enhancement of development knowledge. 
 
WIDER‘s intellectual agenda has never been more timely than it is today. In the aftermath of the 
Great Recession that reduced world output by 2.2 percent in 2009, slowed progress toward the 
Millennium Development Goals, and shattered the hopes of millions of people in developing 
countries, undertaking applied research and policy analysis on development and poverty issues 
remains a key priority for the global community.
1 Moreover, the world is again facing historic 
development challenges—from major natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, 
and droughts to food and fuel price spikes, high unemployment, and new demands for profound 
sociopolitical change in the Middle East and throughout Africa—which can only be confronted 
through sustained and inclusive growth. 
 
Historians tell us that human beings have populated the earth for hundreds of thousands of years. 
Yet as surprising as it may seem, rapid and sustained income growth is a modern phenomenon 
that  appeared  only  after  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  the  18th  century.  For  millennia,  most 
countries stayed at the stage of a relatively backward agrarian economy—disturbed from time to 
time by war and natural calamities and afflicted by the Malthusian trap. Except for the ruling 
classes, craftsmen, and merchants—who represented a minority of the population—most people 
worked in subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry, or fishery. 
 
The Industrial Revolution in England marked the start of a new era in economic history. In the 
first eight decades of the 18th century industrial growth in England, the leading world economy 
at the time, averaged only 0.7–0.8 percent a year. The rate rose rapidly in the 19th century and 
reached average levels of about 2.8 percent a year between 1781 and 1913 (Gerschenkron 1955). 
Most remarkably, output per employed person doubled between 1840 and 1911. Several other 
advanced  economies—most  notably  the  Western  European  countries,  the  United  States,  and 
other Western offshoots—were able to follow in the footsteps of England and accelerate their 
growth. During the past century a few economies in Asia—most notably Japan and the East 
Asian Tigers, including Hong Kong SAR, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taiwan, 
China—were also able to achieve sustained growth and reached high-income status. 
 
                                                 
1 Based on current economic projections, the world remains on track to reduce by half the number of people living in 
extreme poverty. The number of people living on less than $1.25 a day is projected to be 883 million in 2015, 
compared with 1.4 billion in 2005 and 1.8 billion in 1990. However, much of this progress reflects rapid growth in 
China and India, while many African countries lag behind: 17 countries are far from halving extreme poverty, even 
as the aggregate goals will be reached (World Bank 2011). 3 
 
However, most countries in the world failed to have a similar acceleration in their growth.
2 As a 
result, there is a big divergence in income level among countries (figure 1). From an insignificant 
difference at the beginning of the 18th century, per capita income in the developed countries of 
Western Europe and its offshoots increased to more than 20 times that of the developing 
countries by the end of the 20th century.  
 
Figure 1. Diverging Incomes among Nations, 1870–1990 
 
Source: Based on data from Pritchett (1997). 
 
The diverging patterns and performances among world economies are puzzling and have been a 
major topic of research for development economists for many decades. Yet we have an important 
clue: Before the 18th century it took about 1,400 years for the Western world to double its 
income. In the 19th century the same process took about 70 years, and in the 20th century only 
35 years (Maddison 1995). That dramatic acceleration in growth rates came about with the rapid 
technological  innovation  after  the  Industrial  Revolution  and  the  transformation  of  agrarian 
economies  into  modern  industrialized  societies,  with  agriculture‘s  share  of  employment 
declining from more than 80 percent to less than 10 percent. This intriguing trend has led us to 
recognize  that  continuous  structural  change  prompted  by  industrialization,  technological 
innovation, and industrial upgrading and diversification are essential features of rapid, sustained 
growth. 
 
But if the West took 300 years to innovate and industrialize, Japan less than 100, and the East 
Asian  Tigers  only  40  years  to  catch  up,  development  economists  must  find  the  secrets  of 
successful  catching-up  strategies.  More  recently  other  emerging  economies,  such  as  China, 
Brazil, and India, also took off. And the list of low-income countries that are about to join the 
―club‖ keeps growing.
3 However, other  lower-income countries, with more than one-sixth of 
humanity—the people counted as the ―bottom billion,‖ a term coined by Oxford economist Paul 
                                                 
2 Of the 192 member states of the United Nations, only 52 are currently classified as high-income countries. In other 
words, 140 countries (73 percent) are still considered developing economies. 
3 According to the 2008  Growth Report by the Commission on Growth and Development, led by Nobel Laureate 
Michael Spence, 13 economies achieved an average annual growth rate of 7 percent or above for 25 years since the 
end of World War II. In 2000–08, 29 economies achieved that average annual growth rate, and 11 of them were in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Standard deviation of per capita incomes
(Natural log)
Average absolute income deficit from the leader
(Adjusted dollars)4 
 
Collier—continue to be trapped in poverty. The mystery of diverging country performances, 
especially during the second half of the 20th century, persists. 
 
This year‘s lecture is aimed at shedding some new light on the mystery. It is based on my work 
on the new structural economics and its implementation strategy, the Growth Identification and 
Facilitation framework (Lin and Monga 2011).
4 I hope this lecture helps  in understanding how 
the government of a low-income country can accelerate structural change and income growth by 
facilitating the development of new industries  that  reflect the  country‘s  latent  comparative 
advantage,  and  take  advantage  of  new  opportunities  from  the  rising  of  a  multipolar-growth 
world. 
 
The ―flying geese–leading dragons‖ metaphor used in the title sums up the key message of the 
lecture. Economic development is a process of continuous industrial and technological upgrading 
in which any country, regardless of its level of development, can succeed if it develops industries 
that are consistent with its comparative advantage, determined by its endowment structure. The 
secret  winning  formula  for  developing  countries  is  to  exploit  the  latecomer  advantage  by 
building  up  industries  that  are  growing  dynamically  in  more  advanced  countries  that  have 
endowment  structures  similar  to  theirs.  By  following  carefully  selected  lead  countries, 
latecomers  can  emulate  the  leader-follower,  flying-geese  pattern  that  has  served  well  all 
successfully catching-up economies since the 18th century.  
 
The emergence of large middle-income countries such as China, India, and Brazil as new growth 
poles in the world, and their dynamic growth and climbing of the industrial ladder, offer an 
unprecedented  opportunity  to  all  developing  economies  with  income  levels  currently  below 
theirs—including those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Having itself been a ―follower goose,‖ China is 
on  the  verge  of  graduating  from  low-skilled  manufacturing  jobs  and  becoming  a  ―leading 
dragon.‖ That will free up nearly 100 million labor-intensive manufacturing jobs, enough to 
more  than  double  manufacturing  employment  in  low-income  countries.  A  similar  trend  is 
emerging in other middle-income growth poles. The lower-income countries that can formulate 
and implement a viable strategy to capture this new industrialization opportunity will set forth on 
a dynamic path of structural change that can lead to poverty reduction and prosperity. 
 
1. The Mechanics and Benefits of Structural Change 
 
Legendary Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, one of the most influential political leaders and 
thinkers in world history, famously observed that ―the universe is transformation; our life is what 
our thoughts make it.‖ He thus outlined the essentially voluntary nature of success. Writing 
nearly two millennia later, biologist Charles Darwin brought scientific reasoning to Aurelius‘s 
observation and took it to another level by emphasizing the inevitability of transformation. In 
studying what he called ―the struggle for existence,‖ he conjectured that ―more individuals are 
born than can possibly survive. A grain in the balance will determine which individual shall live 
and  which  shall  die,--which  variety  or  species  shall  increase  in  number,  and  which  shall 
                                                 
4 The new structural economics proposes to apply a neoclassical approach to study the determination of economic 
structure and the  mechanism of its evolution in an economy. It is called new structural economics  rather than 
structural  economics  to  distinguish  it  from  the  structuralism  that  prevailed  in  the  early  years  of  development 
economics. See Lin (forthcoming c). 5 
 
decrease, or finally become extinct… The slightest advantage in one being, at any age or during 
any season, over those with which it comes into competition, or better adaptation in however 
slight degree to the surrounding physical conditions, will turn the balance,‖ (Darwin, [1859] 
1964, pp. 467-468). 
  
Economists who have been concerned with the development of poor countries have not quite 
reached that kind of stark diagnostics. Economics is typically not a zero-sum game, and even the 
most  egregious  policy  failures  rarely  push  a  sovereign  country  into  total  bankruptcy  and 
disappearance  from  the  map  of  the  earth.
5 After all, few national economies perish simply 
because of natural selection. But the basic insight that underlies Aurelius ‘s  and  Darwin‘s 
intuition  applies  to  some  extent  to  economic  development:  long-term  growth  depends  on 
continuous structural transformation. 
 
This section discusses the mechanics and benefits of structural change, which characterizes the 
evolution  of  successful  countries  from  low-income,  rural  agrarian  economies  into  urban 
industrial economies with a much higher per capita income. It argues that countries that remain 
poor are those that have failed to achieve successful structural transformation away from their 
agrarian past.  While several researchers have studied that crucial dynamics  and documented 
some stylized facts about it, conceptualizing positive structural change and providing a clear 
policy framework for policy makers in developing countries has been challenging. The  new 
structural  economics,  which  takes  into  account  lessons  from  world  economic  history  and 
advances in economic theory, provides a pragmatic approach for facilitating structural change 
and sustained growth in developing countries. 
 
Early Insights on the Leader-Follower Dynamics 
 
Structural transformation, broadly defined as ―the interrelated processes of structural change that 
accompany economic development‖ (Syrquin 1988, p. 206), has been a subject of active research 
since the beginning of the modern  growth period. Within  that rather  broad  characterization, 
various authors have offered different meanings for that concept. The most common relates to 
the relative importance of sectors in the economy, in terms of production and factor utilization. 
From that perspective it appears that the main changes in structure studied by early development 
economists were the acceleration of technological innovation, the increase in the rate of capital 
accumulation, and the shifts in the sectoral composition of growth, often with changes in the 
main location of economic activity (urbanization). 
 
                                                 
5 Krugman observes that ―the idea that a country‘s economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world 
markets is a hypothesis, not necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong. 
That  is,  it  is  simply  not  the  case  that  the  world‘s  leading  nations  are  to  any  important  degree  in  economic 
competition with each other, or that any of the major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on 
world markets. . . . The bottom line for a corporation is literally its bottom line: if a corporation cannot afford to pay 
its  workers,  suppliers,  and  bondholders,  it  will  go  out  of  business.  So  when  we  say  that  a  corporation  is 
uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is unsustainable—that unless it improves its performance, it will 
cease to exist. Countries, on the other hand, do not go out of business. They may be happy or unhappy with their 
economic  performance,  but  they  have  no  well-defined  bottom  line.  As  a  result,  the  concept  of  national 
competitiveness is elusive‖ (1996, pp. 5 and 6). 6 
 
Simon  Kuznets  took  up  the  task  of  understanding  and  documenting  long-run  transformation 
through a series of stylized facts, though he was reluctant to offer a theory of development. His 
empirical studies identified four features of modern economic growth: First, there is a change in 
the sectoral composition of the economy as the share of the nonagricultural sectors increases and 
that of the agricultural sector decreases (figure 2). Second, this sectoral shift is mirrored in the 
pattern of employment; that is, the proportion of the labor force employed in the nonagricultural 
sectors  rises  while  that  in  the  agricultural  sector  decreases  (figure  3).  Third,  there  is  a 
redistribution  of  the  population  between  the  rural  and  urban  areas.  And  fourth,  there  is  an 
increase  in  the  relative  size  of  the  capital-labor  ratio  in  the  nonagricultural  sectors  of  the 
economy. 
 
Figure 2. A Partial Illustration of the Kuznets Facts:  
Evolution of Sectoral Shares of U.S. Employment, 1800–2000 
 
 
Source: Author‘s adaptation from Kuznets (1966, ch. 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Agriculture and Development:  




Kuznets concluded from these observations that ―some structural changes, not only in economic 
but also in social institutions and beliefs, are required, without which modern economic growth 
would be impossible‖ (1971, p. 348; emphasis in the original). That view was corroborated by 
Chenery, who defined economic development as ―a set of interrelated changes in the structure of 
an economy that are required for its continued growth‖ (1979, p. xvi). And by Abramowitz, who 
noted that ―sectoral redistribution of output and employment is both a necessary condition and a 
concomitant of productivity growth‖ (1983, p. 85).
6 
 
Industrialization in particular was recognized as one of the main engines of economic growth, 
especially in the early stages of development.
7 Its essential characteristics include an increase in 
the proportion of the national income derived from manufacturing activities and from secondary 
industry in general, except perhaps for cyclical interruptions; a rising trend in the proportion  of 
the working population engaged in manufacturing; and an associated increase in the per  capita 
income of the population (see Bagchi 1990). Few countries have  achieved economic success 
without industrializing. Only in circumstances such as  an extraordinary abundance of natural 
resources or land have countries been able to do so  (UNIDO 2009). This is confirmed by the 
strong positive correlation that one can find in recent years (1993 –2007) between the growth of 
value added in the manufacturing sector and the change in GDP per capita. As figure 4 shows, 
the correlation is even stronger in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world. 
 
Figure 4. Industrialization as an Engine of Growth: 
Manufacturing and Income Growth, 1993–2007 
 
 
Looking at these facts,  early development economists embarked on a search for a theory of 
structural change. Rostow (1960) advanced one of the most widely debated early theories of 
structural transformation, the ―stages of development‖ theory, which posits that the central stage 
(or takeoff phase) features two key elements: a sharp increase in the rate of capital accumulation 
and the emergence of a ―leading sector‖ that fosters the change in the production structure. 
Rostow proposed a unique path to development and the need for each country to meet certain 
                                                 
6 Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee expressed a more nuanced view when they  wrote that ―neither structural 
change nor growth in GDP is an exogenous variable; both result from a complex of interacting causes on the supply 
side and demand side‖ (1982, p. 250). 
7 Earlier analyses of the process, dating back to the 1950s and 1960s, found that manufacturing in particular tends to 
play a larger role in total output in richer countries and that higher incomes are associated with a substantially bigger 
role of transport and machinery sectors. See Datta (1952); and Kuznets (1966). 8 
 
―prerequisites‖  before  taking  off.  Not  surprisingly,  and  despite  the  great  insight  of  ―leading 




A pertinent framework that also focused on structural transformation was that of  Alexander 
Gerschenkron, who noted that prerequisites for growth can be substituted for. Analyzing the 
catching-up process among European countries after the Industrial Revolution, he observed that 
rapid industrialization started from different levels of ―economic backwardness‖ and that capital 
accumulation  was  not  a  precondition  for  success.  In  fact,  ―the  more  backward  a  country‘s 
economy, the greater was the part played by special institutional factors [government agencies, 




An obvious criticism of Gerschenkron‘s work was that he studied only the path followed by 
relatively high-income Western countries to catch up with England.
10 Kaname Akamatsu‘s work 
on Japan, a country starting from a much lower level of income than the Western countries, was 
therefore of great interest for developing countries. In a seminal paper initially published in the 
1930s but translated into English only in the 1960s, he documented what he called the ―wild-
geese-flying pattern‖ in economic development, noting that ―wild  geese fly in orderly ranks 
forming  an  inverse  V,  just  as  airplanes  fly  in  formation‖  (1962,  p.  11).  His  observation  is 
illustrated pictorially in figure 5, from a note prepared by the National Graduate Institute for 
Policy Studies in Tokyo for  the GRIPS Development Forum in 2002. 
11. 
                                                 
8 From the point of view of the new structural economics, any economy can start a dynamic growth path if the 
government can facilitate development by the private sector of industries that are consistent with the economy‘s 
comparative  advantage  determined  by  its  existing  endowment  structure.  Therefore,  a  sharp  increase  in  capital 
accumulation is not a necessary condition. The accumulation of capital will increase if the economy starts growing 
dynamically. Therefore, the increase in capital accumulation is a consequence of rather than a precondition for 
dynamic growth. For other comments on Rostow‘s theory, see, most notably, Hoselitz (1960). 
9 From the point of view  of the  new structural economics, the targeted industries for catching up should be 
consistent with a latecomer country‘s latent comparative advantage so that the state‘s role is limited to facilitating 
the private sector‘s entry into the new industry by overcoming the coordination and externality issues, which are 
beset  with  market  failures.  The  most  advanced  country‘s  industries  will  not  be  a  catching-up  country‘s  latent 
comparative advantage if the gap between the two countries‘ levels of development is too large. Private firms in 
those  industries  will  not  be  viable  in  open,  competitive  markets.  Their  initial  investments  will  depend  on  the 
government‘s large capital  mobilization,  and their continual operations  will require the government‘s continual 
subsidies and protections. The attempt to develop industries too far ahead of a country‘s level of development is the 
root cause of the failure of many governments‘ interventions in their country‘s industrial development. 
10 According to  the estimation by Maddison (2010), the per capita  incomes of Germany, France, and the United 
States were about 60–75 percent of Britain‘s in 1870.  
11 GRIPS‘s note draws on Kojima (2000); and Schroeppel and Nakajima (2002). See 
http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/prsp/FGeese.htm. 9 
 




Source: GRIPS (http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/prsp/FGeese.htm). 
Note: ASEAN4 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. NIEs = newly industrialized 
economies, Hong Kong SAR, China; Korea; Singapore; and Taiwan, China.   
 
The  ―flying  geese‖  pattern  describes  the  sequential  order  of  the  catching-up  process  of 
industrialization  by  latecomer  economies.  It  focuses  on  three  dimensions:  the  intraindustry 
dimension, the interindustry dimension, and the international division of labor dimension. The 
first  dimension  involves  the  product  cycle  in  a  particular  developing  country,  whereby  the 
country initially imports the good, later moves to production combined with imports, and finally 
moves to export of the good (and may  even become a net exporter). The second dimension 
involves  the  sequential  appearance  and  development  of  industries  in  a particular  developing 
country, with industries being diversified and upgraded from consumer goods to capital goods or 10 
 
from  simple  to  more  sophisticated  products.  The  third  element  involves  the  relocation  of 
industries  across  countries,  from  advanced  to  developing  countries  as  the  latter  undergo  the 
process of convergence. 
 
Are  the  Asian  geese  described  by  Akamatsu  still  flying?  This  pattern  does  appear  to  have 
persisted in Asia over the past two decades. For example, in the early 1990s China was already a 
dominant player in some light manufactures such as footwear and toys (table 1). Japan continued 
to  be  a  dominant  player  in  toys  but  was  clearly  moving  up  the  technology  ladder  to  more 
sophisticated games, such as Nintendo and Sony PlayStation. China, a low-income country in the 
1990s, also still exported live animals on a large scale. In the 2000s it was able to move up the 
product ladder to more sophisticated manufactures and overtake Japan in world export shares in 
plastics, electrical machinery and parts, and television receivers. Korea was a major player in 
exports of live animals in the early 1990s but has now moved out of that primary sector. India 
lags in market shares but has gradually moved up in footwear. 
 
Table 1. Geese Still Flying in Asia:  
Country Rankings in Selected Industries, 1992 and 2008 
  Live animals  Pharmaceuticals  Footwear  Iron & steel 
Country  1992  2008  1992  2008  1992  2008  1992  2008 
China  1  1  2  3  1  1  3  1 
India  5  4  3  1  4  2  4  4 
Japan  3  3  1  2  5  5  1  2 
Korea, Rep.  2  5  4  4  2  4  2  3 
Thailand  4  2  5  5  3  3  5  5 
                 




receivers  Toys 
Country  1992  2008  1992  2008  1992  2008  1992   2008 
China  3  1  3  1  3  1  1  1 
India  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
Japan  1  2  1  2  1  2  2  2 
Korea, Rep.  2  3  2  3  2  3  3  4 
Thailand  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  3 
Source: World Bank, WITS database. 
Note: Rankings established from data at the two-digit level for exports in the WITS database. 
 
The international division of labor and production offers another angle for examining the flying-
geese pattern. Table 2, based on historical trade statistics for footwear, offers credibility to the 
flying-geese hypothesis. It is constructed using revealed comparative advantage indexes for lead 
countries and latecomers in that industry. The table shows that Japan had a revealed comparative 
advantage in the early 1960s, during the earlier light manufacturing phase of its development. 
Later on other countries moved into the picture and began to take over larger shares of global 
production. The pattern displayed does not conform precisely with a ―pure‖ dynamics of ―flying 
geese.‖  Real-world  data  always  involve  some  ―noise‖  because  products  with  different 
sophistication  and  different  capital  and  technology  intensities  may  be  grouped  in  the  same 
category. And government interventions may cause some deviation of industrial structure away 
from  the  optimal  one  determined  by  the  country‘s  comparative  advantage.  Still,  the  general 




Table 2. Flying Geese and the International Division of Production:  
Asian Economies with a Revealed Comparative Advantage in Footwear, 1962–2000 
 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE. 
Note: Revealed comparative advantage is calculated as the share of footwear in the economy‘s exports divided by 
the share of footwear in global exports. The comparative advantage of a particular economy is ―revealed‖ when this 
ratio is greater than 1. All economies in the table except China are ranked by income level. 
 
 
The development of manufacturing industries in the United States shows a similar flying-geese 
pattern.  Figure  6  shows  the  shares  in  total  employment  over  the  period  1958–2005  for  99 
manufacturing industries, ranked from the most labor intensive to the most capital intensive, in 
the  United  States.  Overall,  the  employment  shares  for  the  most  labor-intensive  industries 
declined continuously over the period, from a high to a low level; for those in the middle range 
the employment shares first increased and then declined; and for the most capital-intensive ones 
the employment shares increased throughout the period, from a low to a high level.  
 
Figure 6. Flying-Geese Pattern in the United States: 
Share in Total Employment for 99 Industrial Sectors Ranked by Labor-Capital Ratio, 1958–2005 
 
Source: Ju, Lin, and Wang, 2011.  
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Across countries with different per capita income levels the pattern of change in the share of 
manufacturing industries in GDP is also consistent with the flying-geese hypothesis. Figure 7 
plots the value added shares in total GDP for 18 manufacturing industries against real GDP per 
capita in 148 small countries in 1963–2006. The value added share for each industry follows an 
inverse V-shape, first increasing with real GDP per capita and then declining. The pattern of 
change is similar for large countries (Haraguchi and Rezonja 2010). 
 
Figure 7. Flying-Geese Pattern in 148 Small Countries: 
Value Added Shares of 18 Industries and Real GDP Per Capita, 1963–2006 
 
Source: Haraguchi and Rezonja 2010. 
Note: Industries are at the ISIC two-digit level. Real GDP per capita is measured in 2005 U.S. dollars. 
 
 
Established Stylized Facts—and Unexplained Failures of Transformation 
 
The empirical literature on the catching-up process has gathered a lot of evidence on economic 
development as a process of structural change and on the patterns associated with that change.
12 
It has established that in some fundamental ways  low-income countries all look very similar. 
They have a large share of the population living in rural areas and employed in agriculture.  And 
much of that agricultural activity is confined to subsistence agriculture. The basic starting point 
is therefore a transformation out o f agricultural activities in rural areas. One can observe the 
same evolution very clearly whether  by looking at a cross-section of countries by level of per 
capita income or by looking at the pattern of production of a single country over time. As figure 
8 shows, higher-income countries have a lower share of the population living in rural areas,  a 
lower share of production in agriculture,  and a lower share of employment in agricultur e. The 
developed countries and the countries that successfully caught up wi th them  have  all  had 
dramatic structural changes in the composition of employment and value   added in primary, 
secondary,  and tertiary industries. By contrast, low -income countries have failed to achieve 
similar structural changes. 
 
                                                 
12 See for example Syrquin (1986); Syrquin and Chenery (1986); Fei and Ranis (1964); and Haraguchi and Rezonja 









Figure 8. Observed Patterns of Structural Change across Country Income Groups 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database.   
Note: Data for rural population and GDP shares are for 2008. Data for employment shares are for 2000 for 
low-income countries (because of limited data availability) and for 2006 for other country groups. Some 
small island states with very high rural population shares were removed as outliers from the high-income 
and  upper-middle-income  groups.  Lines  represent  the  range  of  values  within  each  country  group,  and 
triangles the average. 
 
Yet  development  strategies  have  often  failed  to  deliver  sustained  growth  and  structural 
transformation in many developing countries, especially in Latin America and Africa. A recent 
assessment by McMillan and Rodrik (2011), based on a decomposition of productivity growth 
into two components (sectoral productivity and structural change), is illustrative.
13 It shows that 
most of the difference between  the recent growth in Asia and that in Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa can be explained by the variation in the contribution of structural change to 





                                                 
13 McMillan and Rodrik (2011) construct a simple index based on the idea that productivity differentials exist both 
between broad sectors of the economy and within modern manufacturing activities. These gaps are indicative of the 
allocative inefficiencies that reduce overall labor productivity. But they can potentially be an important engine of 
growth. When labor and other resources move from less productive to more productive activities, the economy 
grows even if there is no productivity growth within sectors. This kind of structural change can be an important 
contributor to overall economic growth.  
 
























































































































The Case of the Republic of Korea
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Figure 9. Contribution of Structural Change:  
Decomposition of Productivity Growth by Country Group, 1990–2005 
 
 Source: McMillan and Rodrik 2011. 
 
 
The situation of African economies is of particular interest because they constitute the core of the 
development challenge today. They exhibit many signs of limited structural transformation that 
corroborate  the  empirical  analysis  by  McMillan  and  Rodrik  and  explain  why  progress  has 
remained slow since independence. In 1965 agriculture contributed 22 percent of Sub-Saharan 
Africa‘s GDP, services 47 percent, and industry 31 percent (of which manufacturing contributed 
17.5 percent). In 2005 it was estimated that agriculture still contributed a healthy 15 percent of 
GDP, while services contributed 52 percent and industry 33 percent (of which manufacturing 
represented less than 15 percent; figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 10. Limited Structural Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa:  
Sectoral Contributions to GDP (left axis) and Real GDP Per Capita (right axis), 1965–2005 
 
                      Sources: For sectoral contributions to GDP, World Bank, World Development  
                       Indicators database; for GDP per capita, Maddison. 
    
The sustained decline in the agricultural share of the labor force that is one of the stylized facts 
of economic development has not been observed in Sub-Saharan Africa. The region‘s economies 
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were overwhelmingly rural in 1960, with agriculture accounting for 85 percent of the labor force. 
While the rural share of the population has fallen steadily over the past four decades, in 2009 it 
was still, at 63 percent, slightly above the 1960 average for other developing countries. With 
high  population  growth,  the  small  change  meant  that  rural  population  density  increased 
substantially, putting pressure on arable land per capita.  
 
In a closed economy a decline in the agricultural share of the labor force can be sustained only if 
labor productivity in agriculture increases rapidly enough to feed a growing urban population. In 
an open economy food can be imported, but agricultural productivity remains a key determinant 
of agricultural household income and overall living standards and an essential source of foreign 
exchange for imported capital goods. But there is little evidence that the modest observed shift 
out of agriculture in Africa was driven by advances in rural labor productivity. Over the 40-year 
period 1960–2000 agricultural value added per worker rose at a trend rate of 0.5 percent a year in 
Sub-Saharan  Africa,  less  than  a  third  of  the  prevailing  rate  in  other  developing  regions.
14 
Empirical studies using growth accounting techniques generally conclude that the growth in real 
GDP per worker in  Sub-Saharan Africa has been driven by the contributions of physical and 
human capital accumulation per worker and t hat total factor productivity (the so-called growth 
residual) has often been nil or negative  (Hall and Jones 1999; Ndulu, O‘Connell, and Bates 
2007).  
 
Not surprisingly, the development of manufacturing has remained very slow in many African 
economies. Indeed, between 1993 and 2007, 21 of 31 Sub-Saharan African countries for which 
data are available experienced deindustrialization.   
 
Economic diversification has also been limited in Africa, as evidenced by the high degree of 
vulnerability of Sub-Saharan African countries to shocks and volatility of annual growth rates, 
much higher than in other developing regions. Many of these small economies rely primarily on 
exports. Yet exports have remained concentrated in a narrow band of primary commodities with 
volatile prices (see Monga 2006) and in many cases have become more concentrated over time 
through the exploitation of mineral resources (see Gersovitz and Paxson 1990; and Berthelemy 
and Soderling 2001). Indeed, African countries have remained exporters of commodities or low-
technology exports while Asian economies have been broadly successful in transforming their 












                                                 
14 According to Ndulu, O‘Connell, and Bates (2007), cereal yields did only slightly better, rising at 0.74 percent a 
year as compared with 2.4 percent in the rest of the world. They also note that relative food prices show little 
evidence of a systemic food crisis, but the answer may lie in rising food imports: the ratio of net imports of food to 
GDP rose by 1.4 percentage points a decade in Sub-Saharan Africa, eight times faster than in the rest of the world.  16 
 
Figure 11. Diverging Patterns in Export Composition in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Data from World Bank Institute and Amoako (2011). 
 
The  stagnation  in  export  upgrading  is  not  surprising:  Sub-Saharan  Africa‘s  shares  of  world 
manufacturing production and exports have declined over the past three decades, from 0.4 and 
0.3 percent in 1980 to 0.3 and 0.2 percent in 2008. 
 
The  limited  number  of  employment  opportunities  created  over  recent  decades  in  the  formal 
sector  should  therefore  be  viewed  as  perhaps  the  most  disturbing  indicator  of  the  lack  of 
structural transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 12, which presents only a small sample 
of countries because of data limitations, nevertheless tells a story that is typical of the region. It 
shows that wage employment is very small and that agricultural workers constitute the bulk of 
the labor force.  
 
Figure 12. Composition of Employment in a Typical Group  
of Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 
Source: Fox 2011. 
Note: Data are for the most recent year available.  
 
 
The fragility of Sub-Saharan Africa‘s labor markets is even more obvious if one digs deeper to 
look into the distribution of employment, excluding or including agriculture, in another typical 
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have made remarkable economic progress in recent years—the share of wage earners in the labor 
force (with or without permanent contracts) is usually around 2 or 3 percent.  
 
Figure 13. Fragility of Labor Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: 












Source: Fox 2011. 
Note: HE = household enterprise. HH = household. 
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The failure to develop and upgrade their industrial structure and to diversify is a particularly 
disturbing stylized fact of African economies. Unlike other developing regions, especially Asia, 
Sub-Saharan Africa has gained only limited benefits from deindustrialization in high-income 
countries. The transition toward a service-dominated economic structure in the United States, the 
European Union, Japan, and other high-income OECD countries, often stimulated by innovation 
and technological upgrading, has involved a retreat of their industrial sector. Globalization and 
the quest for competitiveness and profitability have led many firms in those countries to relocate 
their labor-intensive manufacturing production to middle- and low-income countries—as shown 
by the evolution  of foreign direct  investment  flows  in  recent  years (figure 14). So far Sub-
Saharan  African  countries,  excluding  South  Africa,  received  only  a  small  amount  of  those 
investment flows.  
 
Figure 14. A Relocation of Labor-Intensive Manufacturing:  
Global Flows of Foreign Direct Investment, 1990–2009  








2. Intellectual Lessons from Failures and Successes of Structural Transformation 
 
As Syrquin notes, ―much of the interest in structural transformation derives from its possible 
implications for development policy‖ (1988, p. 209). The many insights of early development 
thinkers  such  as  Akamatsu,  Gerschenkron,  and  Kuznets  certainly  enriched  the  stock  of 
development knowledge. However, they did not answer some of the most burning questions and 





































The Elusive Quest for Structural Transformation 
 
Observing that ―the central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the 
process by which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its 
national income or less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at 
about 12 to 15 percent of national income or more,‖ Lewis concluded that ―the central fact of 
economic development is that the distribution of incomes is altered in favour of the saving class‖ 
(1954, pp. 155 and 156). His analysis assumed that saving is a prerequisite and constraint to 
sustained growth. This is not necessarily the case.
15 But even assuming that it is indeed the case, 
a key question for structural transformation remains: how to foster capital accumulation in poor 
countries? 
 
Besides  the  so -called  saving  constraint,  some  researchers  introduced  foreign   exchange 
requirements or human capital as additional limitations to economic growth  (see for example 
Chenery  and  Bruno  1962;  and  Chenery  and  Strout  1966) .  Again,  assuming  that  these 
assumptions are true, there is an unanswered question: how to overcome such obstacles? 
 
Other important questions have also remained on the structural change agenda: How to facilitate 
the clustering of firms that produces economies of scale? And how to facilitate the emergence of 
the  ―leading  sectors‖  that  can  propagate  growth  and  linkages  to  other  industries?  Even  in 
resource-rich countries there have been many instances of fast growth based on the exploitation 
of  natural  resources  that  did  not  lead  to  structural  transformation—most  notably  when 
employment in the industrial sector did not expand fast enough to absorb a growing labor force. 
Well-known cases include mineral-rich African countries such as Chad, the Republic of Congo, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, and Sudan. 
 
In its attempt to provide answers to these puzzling questions, the recent literature on structural 
transformation  has  expanded  its  field  of  inquiry  to  look  into  such  issues  as  economic 
diversification,  export  composition,  and  industrial  and  technological  upgrading.  Economic 
diversification protects countries from vulnerability to shocks and reflects the pace at which low-
income  economies  reallocate  their  resources  to  take  advantage  of  emerging  opportunities. 
Empirical research suggests that growth rates tend to be lower in economies that fail to engage in 
that  process  and  that  technological  progress  is  faster  in  relatively  sophisticated  sectors  (see 
Hulten and Isaksson 2007). Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) show that in early stages of development, 
sectoral  diversification  is  accompanied  by  geographic  agglomeration.  In  later  stages  of 
development, however, sectoral concentration is accompanied by geographic deagglomeration. 
 
Export composition also seems to matter for sustained growth and structural transformation. In a 
recent study examining the issue, however, Lederman and Maloney (forthcoming) conclude that 
how a country exports may matter even more. One of their main observations is that externalities 
and rents are not associated with all goods equally, which provides grounds for government 
interventions  to  encourage  the  development  of  certain  goods  more  than  the  market  would 
naturally do.
16  
                                                 
15 See footnote 8 and the discussion below. 
16 Lederman and Maloney also note how difficult it is to measure which goods have more potential for rents or 
externalities, which leads them to caution. 20 
 
 
Other  recent  approaches  to  structural  transformation  have  emphasized  the  determinants  of 
technological upgrading and innovation, which are essential ingredients for long-run productivity 
growth. In low-income countries, where budgets for research and development are scarce and 
industries located far from the technological frontier, technological upgrading and innovation 
typically  take  the  form  of  adaptation  and  adoption  of  known  technologies  rather  than  the 
introduction of new ones (see Libecap and Thursby  2008; Aghion 2006; and Aghion and others 
2005). 
 
Despite the importance of these issues, mainstream development economics in recent decades 
has paid only limited attention to industrialization and its role in structural transformation. This 
may be explained primarily by the failure of industrial policies in developing countries, and the 
theoretical argument that the state cannot do better than the private sector in identifying new 
industries.  The  pervasive  failures  of  government  interventions—notably  in  Latin  America, 
Africa, South Asia, and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact—have led to the dominant view 
that policies aimed at ―picking winners‖ are bound to create unsustainable and socially costly 
distortions. 
 
While some countries have actively and successfully pursued industrial policies—mainly in East 
Asia—the  dominant  view  in  the  economic  literature  is  still  a  skeptical  one.  In  their  critical 
review  of  rationales  for  industrial  policy,  Pack  and  Saggi  (2006)  note  sarcastically  that  the 
knowledge civil servants need to successfully design and implement government interventions 
would make them omniscient. But much of the literature on industrial policy fails to make an 
important  distinction  among  country  strategies:  policies  supporting  new  industries  that  are 
inconsistent  with  the  comparative  advantage  of  the  economy  or  attempting  to  protect  old 
industries  that  have  lost  comparative  advantage  generally  fail,  while  policies  facilitating  the 
development  of  new  industries  that  are  consistent  with  the  comparative  advantage  of  the 
economy often succeed (see Lin and Monga 2011). 
 
Beyond  the  widespread  skepticism  about  industrial  policies,  establishing  the  empirical 
regularities of the changing patterns of industrial structure and technological upgrading across 
the world is not a straightforward exercise. Industrialization has been a key feature of successful 
developing  economies  lifting  themselves  out  of  poverty,  but  the  recent  trend  in  the  most 
advanced economies has been toward deindustrialization—that is, a decline in manufacturing 
employment as a share of the total that mirrors a decline in the share of manufacturing value 
added in GDP. This trend has been observed not only in the United States and Europe but also in 
the newly industrialized East Asian  economies  (Hong Kong SAR, China; Korea; Singapore; 
Taiwan,  China).  By  contrast,  the  share  of  employment  in  the  services  sector  has  increased 
steadily in both high- and low-income economies. 
 
These trends, whether similar or contrasting, reflect fundamentally different patterns of change. 
Deindustrialization  in  advanced  and  successful  developing  economies  might  suggest  at  first 
glance that domestic spending on manufactured goods has declined while spending on services 
has  increased.  But  empirical  analyses  and  country  studies  reveal  that  this  is  not  the  case. 
Measured in real terms, the share of domestic expenditure on manufactured goods has been 21 
 
broadly  stable  for  decades.
17 Thus  deindustrialization simply reflects  higher productivity in 
manufacturing than in services, with the patterns of trade specialization among the advanced 
economies explaining why the trend is faster in some countries. It is therefore  a  feature of 
successful economic development.  
 
These  observations  jus tify  much  of  the  skepticism  among  economists  about  government 
interventions in the process of economic development. Yet they also underline the need for 
development  economics  to  provide  a  clear  intellectual  framework  for  u nderstanding  the 
dynamics of structural change and its potential benefits for low-income economies.  
 
To understand why the ambitious policy objectives set by developing country leaders in the 
1950s and 1960s led to poorly designed strategies, one must go back to the starting point of long-
term macroeconomic analysis—the review of the key characteristics of endowment structure. In 
developing  countries,  where  there  is  typically  a  relative  abundance  of  natural  resources  or 
unskilled labor and a scarcity of human and physical capital, only labor-intensive and resource-
intensive industries will have comparative advantages in open, competitive markets; by contrast, 
in  developed  countries,  with  abundant  capital  and  relatively  scarce  labor,  capital-intensive 
industries will be the most competitive (see Heckscher and Ohlin 1991; and Lin 2003). 
 
Acknowledgment  of  that  basic  truth  should  be  the  cornerstone  of  any  viable  development 
strategy. Yet the development paradigm adopted by most developing country leaders after World 
War II and erected as the dominant social thinking in development economics in the 1950s and 
1960s—structuralism—essentially  advocated  heavy  industrialization  strategies.  The  rationale 
was often a noble one, as these leaders had big dreams for their countries, wanting them to 
compete on the global technological frontier as quickly as possible. Thus the strategy advised 
developing  countries  to  develop  the  same  advanced  industries  as  those  in  the  high-income 
industrialized countries.  
 
It was a fatal mistake: the structuralist paradigm was a comparative-advantage-defying strategy 
because it advised countries to give priority to developing capital-intensive heavy industries even 
though capital in their own economies was scarce. The strategy implied very high production 
costs  compared  with  those  in  countries  that  developed  similar  industries  but  followed  their 
comparative advantage. Firms facing such high production costs could not survive in an open, 
competitive market—unless the government was willing and able to grant them strong protection 
through large-scale subsidies or tax incentives. 
 
Examples of such strategies include Indonesia‘s launching a ship construction industry in the 
1960s, when its GDP per capita was only 10 percent of that of its main competitor at the time, 
the Netherlands, and the attempt to build an auto industry in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic 
of Congo) in the 1970s, when the country‘s GDP per capita was only 5 percent of the level in the 
industry leader. The common denominator of these strategies was that the government targeted 
industries in countries whose per capita income was far higher than its own country‘s (table 3). 
                                                 
17 According to Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997), expenditure on services in current price terms has increased in 
the advanced economies. But this growth can be accounted for by the fact that labor productivity has grown more 
slowly in services than in manufacturing, pushing up the relative price of services and making manufactured goods 
relatively cheaper. 22 
 
Consequently, the country was unable to produce the goods at a cost advantage and therefore 
unable to compete in these industries.  
 
Table 3. The Economics of Unrealistic Ambitions 
 
 
To implement the comparative-advantage-defying strategy, developing country governments had 
to protect numerous nonviable enterprises in the priority sectors. Administrative measures to 
which  governments  resorted  to  reduce  the  investment  and  operation  costs  of  nonviable 
enterprises included granting those enterprises a market monopoly, suppressing interest rates, 
overvaluing  domestic  currency,  and  controlling  prices  for  raw  materials.  Such  interventions 
caused  widespread  shortages  in  funds,  foreign  exchange,  and  raw  materials.  Consequently, 
governments also had to allocate resources directly to these enterprises through administrative 
channels,  including  national  planning  in  the  socialist  countries  and  credit  rationing  and 
investment and entry licensing in nonsocialist developing countries. For ease of implementation, 
many countries also relied on state-owned enterprises to develop the targeted industries. 
 
Protection also led to other types of costs. Prices of imports and of import-substituting goods 
increased relative to the world price, pushing the economy to consume the wrong mix of goods 
from the point of view of economic efficiency. Markets fragmented as the economy produced 
too many small-scale goods, again resulting in loss of efficiency. Protectionism also lessened 
competition from foreign firms and encouraged monopoly power among domestic firms whose 
owners  were  politically  well  connected.  Moreover,  it  created  opportunities  for  rents  and 
corruption, which raised input and transaction costs. 
 
In some cases (mainly in Eastern European and other socialist countries of the former Soviet 
Union) the industrial development brought about by the comparative-advantage-defying strategy 
appeared to be successful at the beginning because large-scale investment through massive state 
mobilization of resources increased the growth rate and improved productivity indicators. But 
firms in the capital-intensive sectors depended for their survival on the government‘s subsidies 
and protection, and when the state could no longer mobilize resources for further investment, the 
economy became stagnant. Moreover, the investment in the capital-intensive sectors generated 





Real GDP pc 
Latecomer 
Country






China Automobile 1950s USA 577 10,897 5%
DRC Automobile 1970s USA 761 16,284 5%
Egypt Iron, Steel, Chemicals 1950s USA 885 10,897 8%
India Automobile 1950s USA 676 10,897 6%
Indonesia Ships 1960s Netherlands 983 9,798 10%
Senegal  Trucks 1960s USA 1,511 13,419 11%
Turkey Automobile  1950s USA 2,093 10,897 19%
Zambia Automobile  1970s USA 1,041 16,284 6%
Source: Author's calculations based on data from Maddison (1995).23 
 
The failure of the old structuralist policies to deliver structural transformation, economic growth, 
and prosperity was interpreted as an indication that government interventions in the economy 
were bound to fail because of the inevitable distortions of prices and incentives and the resulting 
misallocation of resources. These views in turn prompted a shift in development thinking toward 
the free-market approach that became known as the Washington Consensus, which promoted 
economic liberalization, privatization, and the implementation of rigorous stabilization programs. 
In terms of growth and employment generation, however, the results of the policies presented as 
alternatives to the failed old structuralism were at best controversial (see Easterly 2001, 2005; 
and World Bank 2005a). The Washington Consensus quickly came to be perceived as ―a set of 
neoliberal  policies  that  have  been  imposed  on  hapless  countries  by  the  Washington-based 
international financial institutions and have led them to crisis and misery‖ (Williamson 2002). 
 
Why  did  the  Washington  Consensus,  which  attempted  to  correct  the  mistakes  of  the  old 
structuralist approach, also fail to foster structural transformation and sustained growth in Africa 
and other low-income countries? The simple answer is that it focused on the government failures 
without  fully  taking  into  consideration  the  crucial  market  failure  issues  of  coordination  and 
externalities inherent in the process of industrial upgrading and diversification. 
 
To reach the income levels of advanced countries, a developing country needs to upgrade its 
industrial structure to the relative capital intensity of those countries. However, the process of 
upgrading the industrial structure to a higher level consistent with the factor endowment cannot 
rely solely on the market mechanism. For example, starting a new industry may be difficult 
because of lack of complementary intermediate inputs or adequate infrastructure for the new 
industry even if the targeted industry is consistent with the economy‘s comparative advantage 
determined by its factor endowment. Private firms may not be able to internalize the investments 
for  the  production  of  those  intermediate  inputs  or  the  provision  of  infrastructure  in  their 
upgrading or diversification decisions. Therefore, the government has an important role to play 
in providing or coordinating investments in necessary infrastructure and complementary inputs.  
 
In  addition,  innovation,  which  underlies  industrial  upgrading  and  diversification,  is  a  risky 
process because it entails a first-mover problem. Both failure and success of a first mover create 
externalities.  When  first  movers  fail,  they  pay  the  cost  of  failure  and  produce  valuable 
information  for  other  firms.  When  they  succeed,  their  experience  also  provides  valuable 
information to other market participants about the type of industries that can be profitable in the 
country. If new firms enter on a large scale, this may largely eliminate the possible rents that the 
first mover may enjoy. In a developed country a successful first mover generally is rewarded 
with a patent and can enjoy the administratively created rent. But in a developing country a 
patent may not be available because the industry is likely to have already existed in higher-
income countries.  
 
Thus while first movers, no matter whether they succeed or fail, generate useful information for 
other firms, they face an asymmetry between the loss of failure and the gain of success. Unless 
the government provides some compensation for the information externality they generate, firms 
will have little incentive to be first movers. And without first movers, an economy will not have 
industrial upgrading and diversification and the dynamic growth that results. 
 24 
 
Putting the Pieces of the Puzzle Together: The New Structural Economics 
 
Once  asked  about  some  of  his  most  enduring  life  lessons,  American  humorist  Arnold  H. 
Glasgow replied: ―Success is simple. Do what‘s right, the right way, at the right time.‖ That 
straightforward piece of advice could not have served well policy makers in developing countries 
who have struggled for decades to come up with effective economic development strategies. The 
first difficulty in doing ―the right thing‖ is to know what the right thing is. Had they chosen to 
simply learn from history and carefully analyze what helped to propel into prosperity countries 
as diverse as England (catching up with and surpassing the Netherlands in the 16th century), the 
United States (catching up with England in the 19th century), Japan after the Meiji Restoration, 
and a few others throughout the 20th century, perhaps they could have meditated upon the words 
of Confucius, who said: ―By three methods we may learn wisdom: first, by reflection, which is 
the noblest; second, by imitation, which is the easiest; and third, by experience, which is the most 
bitter.‖ 
 
The  historical  and  empirical  evidence  discussed  above  suggests  that  a  reexamination  of 
sustainable  growth  strategies  for  developing  countries  should  devote  special  attention  to 
structural change and its corollary, industrial upgrading and diversification, and to an imitation 
(not replication) of the successful approaches that have allowed a small group of countries to 
move from low- to high-income status. The new structural economics outlined in some of my 
previous work proposes such a framework and complements earlier approaches to economic 
development (see Lin 2009, forthcoming c). It takes the following principles into consideration. 
 
First,  the  structure  of  an  economy‘s  factor  endowment,  which  determines  the  economy‘s 
comparative advantage, is given at any specific level of development and differs from one level 
to another. Therefore, the optimal industrial structure of the economy will differ at different 
levels  of  development.  Besides  differences  in  the  capital  intensity  of  industries,  different 
industrial structures imply differences in optimal firm size, scale of production, market range, 
transaction  complexity,  and  nature  of  risks.  As  a  result,  each  industrial  structure  requires 
corresponding soft and hard infrastructure to facilitate its operations and transactions. Examples 
of hard infrastructure are power, transport, and telecommunications systems. Soft infrastructure 
includes the financial system and regulation, the education system, the legal framework, social 
networks, values, and other intangible structures in an economy. In fact, the optimal industrial 
structure determines the economy‘s production frontier, and whether or not the actual production 
will locate on the frontier depends on, among others, the adequacy of infrastructure.  
 
Second,  each  level  of  economic  development  is  a  point  on  a  continuum  from  low-income 
agrarian  to  high-income  industrialized,  not  a  dichotomy  of  two  stages:  poor  versus  rich  or 
developing versus industrialized. Given the endogeneity of industrial structure at each level of 
development,  the  targets  of  industrial  and  infrastructure  upgrading  in  developing  countries 
should not necessarily be the same as those in high-income countries. 
 
Third, following its comparative advantage to build up its industries is the best way for any 
developing  country  to  sustain  industrial  upgrading  and  economic  growth.  By  doing  so,  the 
country  will  be  most  competitive  domestically  and  internationally.  It  will  have  the  highest 
possible income and the most to save at its level of development. Investment will also have the 25 
 
highest possible return and therefore provide the highest incentives to save. As a result, capital 
will accumulate at the fastest possible rate. The country‘s endowment structure will thus change 
from  relatively  resource  or  labor  abundant  to  relatively  more  capital  abundant,  and  its 
comparative advantage to more capital intensive. Latecomers engaged in industrial upgrading 
can  benefit  from  the  advantage  of  backwardness,  as  Gerschenkron  explained,  by  borrowing 
technology from more advanced countries—as observed by Kuznets in his analysis of the leader-
follower relationship and by Akamatsu in his analysis of the flying-geese pattern. Therefore, 
latecomers have the potential to grow much faster than forerunners. 
 
Fourth, the market is a necessary mechanism for a country to follow its comparative advantage in 
the process of development. The reason is that only through market competition will the relative 
prices  in  an  economy  reflect  the  relative  abundance  of  factors  and  induce  firms  to  develop 
industries according to the economy‘s comparative advantage. But because market failures are 
inherent in the process  of industrial upgrading and diversification,  government facilitation is 
required to help firms overcome coordination and externality issues when the economy moves 
from one level of development to another. 
 
That  new  approach  to  development  is  not  just  a  theoretical  argument.  Based  on  historical 
evidence, it explains how latecomers in the development process can exploit their backwardness. 
It also provides a practical economic strategy for countries willing to follow the flying-geese 
pattern, which has served so many successfully catching-up countries since the advent of the 
modern growth period. It is all the more relevant today, with the emergence of new growth poles, 
the spectacular progress of large economies such as China, India, and Brazil, and the many 
opportunities of globalization opening new economic space and new possibilities for low-income 
countries. 
 
As policy makers in poor countries contemplate the difficult challenges facing their countries 
after decades or even centuries of mistaken strategic choices, they should not cede to despair but 
assess the many options that lie ahead of them. As dire as their country situation may seem, it is 
not desperate. Indeed, in an increasingly globalized world, where more and more countries have 
moved toward high-income status, developing country leaders should keep in mind the advice of 
American motivational author Denis Waitley, who wrote: ―Losers live in the past. Winners learn 
from the past and enjoy working in the present toward the future.‖ 
 
3. A Unique Window of Opportunity for Africa: The Graduation of China (and Other 
Middle-Income Countries) 
 
In the aftermath of the recent global recession, World Bank President Robert Zoellick described 
the new economic landscape:  
 
If 1989 saw the end of the ―Second World‖ with Communism‘s demise, then 
2009 saw the end of what was known as the ―Third World‖: We are now in a new, 
fast-evolving multipolar world  economy—in  which some developing countries 
are  emerging  as  economic  powers;  others  are  moving  towards  becoming 
additional poles of growth; and some are struggling to attain their potential within 
this new system—where North and South, East and West, are now points on a 26 
 
compass, not economic destinies. . . . We are witnessing a move towards multiple 
poles of growth as middle classes grow in developing countries, billions of people 
join  the  world  economy,  and  new  patterns  of  integration  combine  regional 
intensification with global openness. (2010)  
 
As  Zoellick‘s  words  suggest,  today‘s  rapidly  evolving  world  economy  is  opening  important 
opportunities for low-income countries. Following the logic of the new structural economics and 
its  underlying  flying-geese  patterns  in  economic  development,  this  section  discusses  those 
opportunities,  most  notably  China‘s  emergence  as  ―the  world‘s  factory‖  for  labor-intensive 
industries and its upcoming graduation from such economic activities. 
 
Multipolarity and Its Potential Dividends 
 
During the first decade of this century a burst of convergence occurred as developing countries 
grew  substantially  faster  than  high-income  countries.  As  a  result  of  this  superior  growth, 
widespread across developing regions, the world has indeed entered a new era, with emerging 
economies becoming new growth poles. In the 1980s and 1990s, among the top five contributors 
to global growth, all except China were G7 industrialized countries. But in 2000–09 all except 
the United States were emerging economies—with China having become the top contributor 
(figure 15). The trend is being reinforced in the aftermath of the 2007–09 global crisis: the 
recovery is characterized by a two-speed pattern, with developing countries as a group growing 
more than twice as fast as high-income countries. 
 
 
Figure 15. Top Five Contributors to Global Economic Growth by Decade（percentage） 
     
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data from World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
 
That shift in economic weight is likely to produce major benefits for the world economy, with 
positive effects for both high-income and developing countries. For high-income countries the 
growth  of  emerging  economies  will  expand  markets  for  their  exports  of  capital  goods  and 
intermediate goods. For many developing countries that are still major producers of agricultural 
and natural resource commodities, higher consumption and production levels in the new growth 
poles will continue to support adequate prices for their commodity exports. In addition, firms and 
governments in emerging economies will provide funds for infrastructure and natural resource 






























These benefits are already happening—and are likely to continue into the future. Propelled by 
domestic  demand  for  raw  materials,  Brazil  has  rapidly  expanded  investment  and  trade  with 
Africa, with imports from the continent rising from $3 billion in 2000 to $18.5 billion in 2008.
18 
Similarly, bilateral trade between China and Africa increased from $10 billion in 2000 to $91  
billion in 2009 and China‘s investment in Africa jumped from $490 million in 2003 to $9.33 
billion in 2009 (China, Information Office of State Council. 2010). Indeed, Chinese finance has a 
growing role in Africa, the developing region facing the greatest constraints on access to finance 
(Wang 2009) . Meanwhile, the government of India—observing that 5 of the world‘s 12 fastest-
growing economies are Sub-Saharan Africa, a continent richly endowed with natural resources—




More important than these beneficial trade and financial flows, the dynamic growth of the new 
poles will provide golden opportunities for industrialization in  lower-income countries. China, 
because of its size and income level, should be of particular interest.  After a long period of 
sustained growth (at 9.9 percent annually in real terms for  30 years), the Chinese economy is 
now at an important crossroad, with wages rising rapidly and  surplus labor disappearing. All 
countries  experiencing  economic  success  over  such  a  long  period  eventually  face  such 
challenges, and China will need to upgrade its industrial structure and enter new industries in 
order to maintain its dynamic growth. As China moves into more sophisticated product markets, 
it will leave market space for other developing countries to enter the more labor -intensive 
industries.  
 
A Tectonic Shift Ahead—with Opportunities 
 
The early 1980s marked the beginning of a new era of economic development in which China 
has emerged as a powerhouse. It is hard to remember that only 30 years ago, in 1980, China was 
much poorer than most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa; its GDP per capita, at $195, was lower 
than that of Ethiopia or Mozambique. In 1990 China was still a low-income country, with a per 
capita income (measured in purchasing power parity) 30 percent lower than the Sub-Saharan 
African average. Today China is a middle-income country, with a per capita income three times 
the Sub-Saharan African average, at nearly $4,000. Its share of world GDP is nearing 9 percent, 
and its economy ranks as the world‘s second largest, next only to the United States. Without oil, 
cocoa, coffee, cotton, timber, diamonds, or uranium to export, China, a country of 1.3 billion 
people, has achieved spectacular progress.  
 
China achieved this success over the past three decades through the disciplined implementation 
of a realistic economic strategy that was consistent with the country‘s endowment structure and 
made great use of its comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries. China followed a two-
                                                 
18 See Lapper (2010). In Mozambique, for example, Brazilian companies are working to develop coal reserves, build 
a power station, and construct rail and port infrastructure to bring the coal to export markets. In Angola a Brazilian 
firm has become the largest private sector employer, with activities including food and ethanol production, offices, 
factories, and supermarkets.  
19 Statement by Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry Anand Sharma reported by Leadership (Abuja, Nigeria), 
January 15, 2010. 28 
 
pillar strategy: First, adopting a dual-track approach to reforms—giving transitory protections to 
old  comparative-advantage-defying,  capital-intensive  sectors  and  liberalizing  entry  to 
comparative-advantage-conforming,  labor-intensive  sectors,  and  thereby  simultaneously 
achieving  both  stability  and  dynamic  transformation.  Second,  as  a  latecomer,  choosing  an 
economic development strategy that taps the potential of the advantage of backwardness along 
the lines of the flying-geese pattern.
20 Looking forward, China can still rely on the advantage of 
backwardness and has the potential to maintain dynamic growth for another 20 years or more.
21 
 
Behind  China‘s  growth  over  the  past  three  decades  has  been  a  dramatic  structural 
transformation—in particular, rapid urbanization and industrialization. At the start of economic 
reforms in the 1980s China was primarily an agrarian economy. Even in 1990, 73.6 percent of its 
population lived in rural areas, and primary products accounted for 27.1 percent of GDP. In 2009 
these shares had declined to 27.1 percent and 11.3 percent. A similar change occurred in the 
composition  of  China‘s  exports.  In  1990  primary  products  made  up  an  important  share  of 
merchandise exports. Today almost all of China‘s exports are manufactures (figure 16).  
 
Figure 16. The Structural Transformation of China’s Exports 
 
   
          Source: World Bank, WITS database. 
 
 
China is unquestionably the dragon in the global marketplace for low-tech products today. In the 
four product categories in which it has the highest global market concentration, China‘s share of 
global exports exceeds 35 percent—and in travel goods and handbags is close to 50 percent 
(table  4).  Most  impressive  is  the  rate  at  which  its  share  has  grown.  For  travel  goods  and 
handbags, for example, its share in 1976 was only 1.6 percent.  
                                                 
20 For further discussion of these two points, see Lin (forthcoming b). 
21 The estimation by Angus Maddison (2010)  shows that China‘s per capita income in 2008 was 21 percent of U.S. 
per  capita  income  (measured  in  purchasing  power  parity). This  income  gap  indicates  that  there  is  still  a  large 
technological  gap  between  China  and  the  industrialized  countries.  China  can  therefore  continue  to  enjoy  the 
advantage of backwardness before closing up the gap. China‘s current status relative to the United States is similar 
to that of Japan in 1951, Korea in 1977, and Taiwan, China, in 1975. Annual GDP growth was 9.2 percent in Japan 
in 1951–71, 7.6 percent in Korea in 1977–97, and 8.3 percent in Taiwan, China, in 1975–95. China‘s development 
strategy after the reform in 1979 is similar to that of these three economies (Lin forthcoming a). 






















Table 4. The Dragon in the Global Marketplace for Low-Tech Products:  
China’s Percentage Share of Labor-Intensive Exports, 1976–2009 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE (SITC two-digit level). 
 
An important consequence of China‘s rapid rise to dominance as a global exporter of labor-
intensive products has been the absorption of its vast reserves of unskilled labor, especially from 
rural areas. Some labor economists still predict that China will remain a ―labor surplus‖ country 
until 2014. But the growing demand for service sector employees as well as the reluctance of 
some workers to leave rural areas will gradually stretch China‘s job market, particularly at the 
low  end  (McMillan  2011).  So  will  China‘s  shift,  following  the  flying-geese  pattern  of 
development, from labor-intensive industries toward a more advanced industrial structure, with 
machinery increasingly dominant in manufactured exports. Labor productivity is indeed a key 
driver of wage dynamics. As the economy continues the process of industrial upgrading against 
the backdrop of burgeoning global demand for labor-intensive products, wage rates will rise and 
erode China‘s competitive edge in such products.  
 
 
Indeed, China has already seen rapid growth in wages. Manufacturing wages rose from just over 
$150 a month in 2005 to around $350 in 2010 (about $4,200 a year).
22 As a consequence, the 
wage gap between China and some upper-middle-income countries is closing, and this trend is 
almost certain to continue over the coming decade. China‘s 12th Five-Year Plan projects that the 
economy will grow at 7 percent a year on average during 2011–15—and, for the first time in the 
country‘s history, proposes that real wages will grow at least as fast as GDP. Both growth rates 
are likely to be achieved. That would imply a doubling of real monthly wages over the next 
decade, to  around $700 a month.  If the likely  continued currency  appreciation  is  added up, 
China‘s real wages could approach $1,000 a month within a decade, the level in such upper-
middle-income countries as Brazil and Turkey today—and $2,000 a month by 2030, the level in 
Korea and Taiwan, China today.  
 
China is at a stage like that reached by Japan in the 1960s and Hong Kong SAR, China; Korea; 
Singapore;  and  Taiwan,  China,  in  the  1980s.  To  continue  growing  dynamically  against  the 
background of declining wage competitiveness, China will have to follow the path of the earlier 
Asian  ―geese‖  and  start  to  relocate  its  labor-intensive  industries  to  low-income  countries.
23 
Indeed, this is already happening. A large share of China‘s outward foreign direct investment in 
Africa, which had reached $9.33 billion by the end of 2009, has gone to manufacturing (22 
percent), second only to the share in mining (29 percent). And China is building six economic 
                                                 
22 Data from Oxford Analytica, March 28, 2011.  
23 Based on the estimation by Maddison (2010), China‘s per capita income (measured in purchasing power parity) 
was 6,725 international dollars in 2008, the same level as in Japan in 1966, Korea in 1986, and Taiwan, China, in 
1983. These economies started to relocate their labor-intensive manufacturing industries at that income level, Japan 
to the East Asian Tigers and Korea and Taiwan, China, to mainland China. 
SITC CODE PRODUCT 1976 1980 1990 2000 2005 2009
83 Travel goods, handbags 1.6 2.8 5.6 31.7 38.2 47.5
75 Office mach. & automatic data process. Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.3 5.2 25.1 40.4
85 Footwear 1.4 1.7 7.4 25.9 32.8 39.0
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 2.1 4.2 9.3 18.5 27.0 35.930 
 
and trade cooperation zones in the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, and 
Zambia (China, Information Office of State Council 2010). More  such initiatives are  likely to 
happen. 
 
How Big Might the Benefits Be? 
 
As China moves forward, there will be a major difference with earlier patterns of industrial 
upgrading: its economy is significantly larger than those of the geese that led the first round of 
structural  transformation  in  Asia  (table  5).  China  has  an  estimated  85  million  workers  in 
manufacturing, most of them in labor-intensive sectors. The reallocation of these workers to 
higher value added, more sophisticated products and tasks will open up great opportunities for 
labor-abundant, lower-income countries to step in and produce the labor-intensive manufacturing 
goods that China leaves behind. As a result, China will not be a goose in the traditional leader-
follower pattern of industrialization for a few lower-income countries but a dragon.  
 
  
Table 5. Comparing Manufacturing in China with That in Earlier Geese at Similar Levels of Development 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators database; International Labour Organization, LABORSTA; 
China, National Bureau of Statistics (2010). 
 
In the absence of detailed data on manufacturing employment in all African countries, one can 
only  conjecture  about  the  size  of  the  potential  gains  for  the  region.  Still,  even  back-of-the-
envelope  calculations  suggest  that  the  benefits  would  be  enormous.  In  2009  alone,  China 
exported $107 billion of apparel to the world, compared with Sub-Saharan Africa‘s total apparel 
exports of $2 billion (2 percent of Chinese apparel exports). Let‘s assume that as a result of 
rising  wages,  1  percent  of  China‘s  production  of  apparel  is  shifted  to  lower-wage  African 
countries. All things equal, that alone would boost African production and exports of apparel by 
47 percent. A 5 percent shift of Chinese export-related investments in the industry could translate 
into $5.4 billion in additional exports—a 233 percent increase. 
 
Even rough employment estimates suggest the potential gains in manufacturing jobs. Africa‘s 
population (north and south of the Sahara) is 1 billion, slightly less than India‘s 1.15 billion. In 
2009 manufacturing value added was 16 percent of GDP in India, 13 percent in Sub-Saharan 
African  countries,  and  16  percent  in  North  African  countries  such  as  Egypt,  Morocco,  and 
Tunisia.
24 India‘s employment in manufacturing was 8.7 million in 2009. So it is reasonable to 
assume that total manufacturing employment in Africa is at most 10 million. This suggests that 
relocation of even a small share of China‘s 85 million labor-intensive manufacturing jobs would 
                                                 
24 Data from the World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
 
     
GDP per capita  
(constant US$)  Manufacturing  
Country   Year  2000 US$ 
2005 US$ 
(PPP) 
Share of value 
added (%) 




China  2009  2,206  6,200  43  17.7  85 
Japan  1960  5,493  6,976  35  20.0  9.7 
Korea, Rep.  1982  3,709  6,123  25  14.6  2.3 31 
 
go  a  long  way  toward  creating  new  opportunities  for  employment  and  sustained  growth  in 
Africa.
25 Clearly, the potential opportunities for Africa‘s labor-intensive economies, which today 
are exporting mostly minerals are enormous.  
 
The story  for  low-income countries  elsewhere  in  the world  is  similar.  In 2009, with  a  total 
population  of  846  million  and  13  percent  of  their  GDP  coming  from  manufacturing,  their 
employment in the sector likely amounted to no more than 10 million. Thus, just as for African 
countries, China‘s industrial upgrading would provide them a golden opportunity for dynamic 
manufacturing-led growth. But for developing countries everywhere, the ability to benefit from 
the  opportunities  depends  on  their  quickly  formulating  and  implementing  credible  economic 
development strategies that are consistent with their comparative advantage and the flying-geese 
paradigm. 
  
A Road Map for Seizing the Moment: The Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework 
 
The  coming  graduation  of  China  and  other  middle-income  growth  poles  from  low-skilled 
manufacturing jobs is timely for low-income countries. But it is especially so for those in Sub-
Saharan  Africa.  Despite  the  region‘s  grim  long-run  performance  and  the  potentially  heavy 
economic  and  human  cost  of  the  recent  global  crisis,  there  is  renewed  optimism  about  its 
economic prospects: since the mid-1990s Africa has embarked on a new and higher growth 
trajectory. The main challenge facing African leaders is to avoid the policy mistakes of the past 
and instead implement the winning strategy.  
 
Africa may be on the verge of an economic takeoff, recent empirical work suggests. Young 
(2010) sees an ―African growth miracle‖ in his analysis of such measures as real consumption, 
housing quality, and health and education. His results show that for the past two decades living 
standards in Sub-Saharan Africa have been rising by more than 3 percent a year—more than 
three times the rate indicated in international data sets. Using a new methodology to estimate 
income distribution, poverty rates, and inequality and welfare indexes for African countries in 
1970–2006, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2010) conclude that African poverty is falling—and 
is falling rapidly. Moreover, they find that the growth spurt that began in 1995 appears to have 
reduced African income inequality rather than increased it. Radelet has identified 17 African 
countries that achieved annual per capita growth rates of 2 percent or more in 1996–2008 by 
putting behind them the conflict, stagnation, and dictatorships of the past and replacing them 
with  steady  economic  growth,  deepening  democracy,  improved  governance,  and  decreased 
poverty (see Radelet 2010).  Five fundamental changes are seen to be at work: more democratic 
and accountable governments, more sensible economic policies, the end of the debt crisis and 
                                                 
25 The creation of manufacturing jobs, especially through foreign direct investment, generally leads to the creation of 
jobs in other sectors through backward and forward linkages (see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006) and 
through multiplier effects as additional employment raises income levels. Backward linkages tend to be weaker in 
developing  countries  because  it  is  often  difficult  to  source  local  products.  But  forward  linkages  can  have  a 
substantial  effect  on  employment.  In  Lesotho,  for  example,  computable  general  equilibrium  model  simulations 
indicate that the employment of 56,000 workers in the garment sector, sustained by foreign direct investment flows, 
could have led to the creation of 77,000 additional nonmanufacturing jobs (see World Bank 2005b). In India it is 
estimated that creating 2.5 million jobs in the information technology sector could lead to 8.3 million additional jobs 
(NASSCOM 2011). 32 
 
changing relationships with donors, the spread of new technologies, and the emergence of a new 
generation of policy makers, activists, and business leaders. 
 
Indeed, the improvement in Sub-Saharan Africa‘s performance has been made possible largely 
by  greater  political  and  macroeconomic  stability,  a  stronger  political  commitment  to  private 
sector growth, and higher investment in infrastructure and education (see Okonjo-Iweala 2010). 
High  prices  for  oil,  minerals,  and  other  commodities  have  contributed  substantially  to  GDP 
growth. But new research by the McKinsey Global Institute shows that resources accounted for 
only about a third of the improvement in performance. The rest resulted from internal structural 
changes that have spurred the broader domestic economy (see Leke and others 2010). Most 
economies  in  the  region  have  been  implementing  macroeconomic,  institutional,  and  sectoral 
reforms to improve the business climate and reduce transaction costs. For example, by 2010, 28 
Sub-Saharan African countries had adopted the Extractive Industries Transparency  Initiative, 
aimed at improving the transparency of company payments for and government revenue from 
oil, gas, and mining. The region has the fastest-growing cellular telecommunications market, 
increasing from less than 2 million mobile phones in 1998 to more than 400 million in a decade. 
Industries such as banking, retail, and construction are also booming, and private investment 
inflows are surging, though from a low level. 
 
While the region‘s collective GDP is still roughly equal to that of a single emerging economy 
such  as  Brazil  (about  $1.6  trillion  in  2008),  its  recent  economic  progress  cannot  be 
underestimated. Since 1990 Sub-Saharan Africa has almost tripled its exports and diversified its 
trade partners.
26 Natural resources will clearly continue to be the region‘s main source of export 
revenue  as  global  demand  grows.  But  with  continued  reforms  and  increasing  foreign  direct 
investment going to industries with overt or latent comparative advantages, African economies 
are likely to become more diversified in the future, with the global demand for nontraditional 
exports also growing. 
 
Still, per capita growth rates in the range of 2–3 percent a year may not be enough to combat 
poverty  and  generate  prosperity.  So  far,  Africa‘s  economic  development  has  been  driven 
primarily by higher consumption—supported in part by an inflow of remittances in response to 
improved macroeconomic policies—and the growing contribution of natural resources to GDP. 
For growth to be sustainable and to create jobs, it also needs to be supported by structural change 
based on manufacturing-driven industrialization.  
 
It  is  therefore  imperative  that  African  countries  follow  the  flying-geese  pattern  to  seize  the 
opportunity provided by the industrial upgrading of China and other leading dragons. The key 
challenge is to find a way to sustain the momentum and foster structural transformation in Sub-
Saharan Africa so as to achieve annual growth rates of 8 percent or more. This is feasible if 
policy makers help their economies develop industries according to their comparative advantage 
and tap the potential of the advantage of backwardness.  
 
                                                 
26 Okonjo-Iweala (2010) notes that the share of Sub-Saharan Africa‘s exports going to the European Union and the 
United States fell from 73 percent in 1990 to 49 percent, (2008). During this time the region‘s exports to China 
increased from $64 million to more than $13 billion. 33 
 
Policy  makers  in  any  developing  country  can  do  so  through  the  Growth  Identification  and 
Facilitation framework, which I have proposed elsewhere as an implementation tool for the new 
structural economics. The framework provides a user-friendly, six-step approach to help identify 
the  industries  with  latent  comparative  advantages  and  facilitate  competitive  private  sector 
development (see Lin and Monga 2011): 
   
  First, identify those dynamically growing tradable goods and services that China and 
other  fast-growing,  lower-middle-income  countries  have  successfully  produced  for  a 
period  of  about  20  years.  These  are  likely  to  be  new  industries  consistent  with  the 
country‘s latent comparative advantage. 
 
  Second, among the industries on that list, identify those that domestic private firms have 
already entered spontaneously and try to pinpoint any obstacles that may be preventing 
them  from  upgrading  the  quality  of  their  products  or  any  barriers  that  may  be 
discouraging other private firms from entering. This could be done using value chain 
analysis or the Growth Diagnostics Framework suggested by Hausmann, Rodrik, and 
Velasco (2005). The government can then implement policies to remove the constraints 
at home, carrying out randomized controlled experiments to test the effectiveness of the 
policies in eliminating the constraints before scaling them up to the national level. 
 
  Third, in industries on the list that are new to domestic firms, encourage investment by 
firms in China or other higher-income countries producing those goods, since those firms 
would have an incentive to relocate production to the lower-income country so as to 
reduce labor costs. The government could also set up incubation programs to assist the 
entry of private domestic firms in these industries. 
 
  Fourth, take advantage of unexpected opportunities that may arise from the country‘s 
unique endowments  or  from  new  technological  breakthroughs  around the world.  The 
government should pay close attention to successful discoveries and engagement in new 
business niches by private domestic enterprises and provide support to scale up those 
industries. 
 
  Fifth, in a country with poor infrastructure and an unfriendly business environment, set 
up special economic zones or industrial parks to help overcome barriers to firm entry and 
foreign investment. These can create preferential environments that most governments, 
because of budget and capacity constraints, are unable to implement for the economy as a 
whole  in  a  reasonable  time  frame.  Establishing  industrial  parks  or  zones  can  also 
facilitate the formation of industrial clusters.  
 
  Sixth,  grant  pioneer  firms  in  the  identified  industries  time-limited  tax  incentives, 
cofinancing  of  investments,  or  access  to  foreign  exchange—to  compensate  for  the 
externalities created by first movers and encourage firms to form clusters. Because the 
identified industries are consistent with the country‘s latent comparative advantage, the 
incentives provided by the government could and should be limited in both time and 
financial cost and, to avoid rent seeking and political capture, should not take the form of 
monopoly rent, high tariffs, or other distortions. 34 
 
 
Two other points are worth mentioning. First, while the emphasis has been on the importance of 
industrialization  to  achieve  structural  transformation  and  dynamic  growth  in  developing 
countries,  technological  innovation  and  productivity  improvement  in  agriculture  cannot  be 
overlooked.  In  low-income  countries,  where  most  people  live  on  agriculture,  improving 
agriculture will be important not only for reducing poverty but also for generating economic 
surplus to support industrialization. Governments need to facilitate the innovation and extension 
of  agricultural  technology  and  improvement  of  infrastructure  for  agricultural  production  and 
commercialization. 
 
Second,  resource-abundant  developing  countries,  besides  ensuring  transparency  in  and  good 
management of the wealth generated from the natural resources, should invest part of the wealth 
in  infrastructure  and  human  capital.  This  will  facilitate  the  economy‘s  diversification  into 
nonresource sectors, creating jobs and promoting inclusive growth—and turning the resources 




Structural  transformation  is  the  condition  for  sustained  growth  and  poverty  reduction.  This 
subject was at the center of development thinking after World War II thanks to such researchers 
as Simon Kuznets (who pioneered research on national income and its components), Alexander 
Gerschenkron (who suggested that there are advantages to backwardness), Kaname Akamatsu 
(who documented the flying-geese pattern of Asian economies catching up with industrialized 
Western economies), and old structuralists (who tried to provide a solution for narrowing the gap 
in industrial structures between advanced and developing countries). Development economists 
were able to establish empirically that shifting resources out of traditional agriculture and other 
low-productivity primary activities sustains the productivity gains that characterize economic 
development. As a result, industrialization (especially manufacturing) was recognized as one of 
the main engines of economic growth.  
 
Concerned  about  market  failures,  and  wanting  to  catch  up  with  industrialized  countries  as 
quickly  as  possible,  many  researchers  and  policy  makers  in  developing  countries  that  had 
emerged  from  colonialism  were  obsessed  with  quick  modernization  strategies.  The  old 
structuralist import-substitution strategies often adopted in the 1950s and 1960s led to misguided 
and unrealistic government interventions. Countries with a large labor supply but little capital 
often engaged in heavy industries that defied their comparative advantage. These were costly 
mistakes, typically resulting in pervasive distortions, macroeconomic imbalances, low growth, 
and little or no structural transformation, especially in terms of a reduction in agriculture‘s share 
of employment. 
 
Unfortunately, the remedies for these policy mistakes often consisted simply of rejecting almost 
any  government  interventions  in  industrial development  and structural  transformation  on the 
ground that they could only lead to government failures. In the late 1970s and 1980s, under the 
dominant new development paradigm known as the Washington Consensus, it was assumed that 
if the business environment was improved, the private sector would spontaneously seize business 
opportunities, creating jobs and prosperity. 35 
 
 
A  generation  later  many  developing  countries  still  have  not  experienced  structural 
transformation.  Instead,  many  of  them  have  experienced  structural  regression,  with 
manufacturing contributing a declining share of GDP.  
 
Only a small group of countries in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa have been able to 
engineer sustained dynamic growth and structural transformation and achieve convergence with 
high-income  countries.  They  have  generally  done  so  by  using  market  mechanisms  and 
government facilitation to replicate, in different contexts, the same types of development paths 
that allowed previously successful countries to ignite what Kuznets called the period of ―modern 
economic growth.‖ 
 
The lessons from history and from economic theory are now clear: regardless of size, location, or 
natural resources, all developing countries can achieve annual growth rates of 8 percent or more 
for  decades  and  embark  on  the  path  of  prosperity,  provided  that  they  carefully  follow  their 
comparative advantage, tap the potential of the latecomer advantage, and engage in activities that 
will  dynamically  transform  their  economic  structure.  This  WIDER  lecture  has  suggested  a 
framework for doing just that. Drawing from previous work on the new structural economics, it 
has provided a consistent analysis of economic success and failure—and explained how lower-
income countries today may benefit from the opportunity arising from the dynamic industrial 
upgrading of leading dragons such as China and other large emerging economies. 
 
For  low-income  countries  in  Africa  and  elsewhere,  the  news  is  good:  in  an  increasingly 
globalized world, opportunities for economic transformation abound. Far from being a curse, the 
emergence  of  a  multipolar-growth  world  is  in  fact  a  blessing  for  even  the  most  backward 
economies—because  it  provides  them  the  opportunity  to  enter  a  new  age  of  rapid 
industrialization and structural transformation. In the next decade China, with some 85 million 
labor-intensive  manufacturing  jobs  today,  will  have  to  move  up  the  industrial  ladder  and 
therefore graduate from low-skilled sectors. This will free up a gigantic reservoir of employment 
possibilities that African and other low-income countries can tap. The dynamic growth of other 
middle-income  economies—such  as  Brazil,  India,  and  Indonesia—will  provide  a  similar 
opportunity. But to fully benefit from those opportunities, policy makers in low-income countries 
must quickly plan for it and implement credible development strategies. Abraham Lincoln might 
have been wrong when he said that ―the best thing about the future is that it comes only one day 
at a time.‖ The future is now. The World Bank‘s dream of a world free of poverty may finally 
become a reality. 
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